EL VIRUS DE EBOLA Y LA NARRATIVA DE LAS PANDEMIAS.
THE EBOLA VIRUS AND THE NARRATIVE OF PANDEMIC.
THE HAMMER HEADED BAT
THE EBOLA VIRUS
SOURCE: THE NEW JOURNAL OF MEDICINE ENGLAND
UPDATED 2026
Hello everyone, as we said in the previous NOTE, due to the international ALARM launched by WHO, today we bring you a complete review of the updated EBOLA VIRUS: THE EBOLA VIRUS AND THE NARRATIVE OF PANDEMICS, mainly because the media and Social Networks are the CREATORS of waves of PANIC among the population, and NONE of the PREVIOUS ALERTS (HANTAVIRUS, MARBURG VIRUS AND MONKEYPOX), ended in a pandemic. Certainly the population, in view of what happened with the PANDEMIC of Sars-Cov-2 or COVID-19 worldwide, is HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE to these notices.
1.) DEFINITION:
The VIRUS of
EBOLA is a
FILOVIRUS, (just like the
MARBURG VIRUS), a
very lethal RNA virus,
discovered in 1976 in
Africa, which causes a
SEVERE HEMORRHAGIC FEVER
with high mortality and
outbreaks mainly in
sub-Saharan Africa (1,2).
2.) HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE EBOLA VIRUS:
The EBOLA VIRUS was first identified in
1976,
during two nearly simultaneous outbreaks that occurred in in present-day
Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), in the village Yambuku,
near the
Ebola
river, and in the areas of
Nzara and
Maridi in Sudan; from the first outbreak described near the river Ebola, came the name by which it has been known until today (1,3).
Since its discovery multiple outbreaks (more than twenty) have been described in various African countries, highlighting the major epidemic of 2014-2016 in West Africa, which became the largest event in number of cases and deaths reported (3,4).
3.) FIRST OUTBREAK EBOLA VIRUS, CHRONOLOGY:
The first documented outbreak of the disease caused by the virus Ebola
was recorded in 1976 and
constitutes a central milestone in the history of
VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVERS in Africa and in global public health (1,3).
That year there were in fact two distinct but nearly simultaneous outbreaks:
A- One in then Zaire, today the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in the village of Yambuku near the Ebola river.
In the Yambuku outbreak, in present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo, approximately 318 cases were reported, most of them initially linked to a missionary hospital, and reuse of medical supplies without proper sterilization, which favored nosocomial transmission (1,3).
The clinical course of patients was characterized by a sudden onset of fever high, intense malaise and, in numerous cases, progression to hemorrhagic manifestations and multiple organ failure, making it one of the episodes with the highest lethality recorded for this disease (1,3,4).
B- The other in Sudan, now South Sudan, in the localities of Nzara and later Maridi; the disease was named after the river near the Congolese focus, that is to say Ebola (1,3,4).
The Sudan outbreak originated in the city of Nzara and later spread to Maridi, significantly affecting factory workers and their close contacts, with about 284 people sick in total (2,3), with mortality somewhat lower than in the outbreak that occurred in Congo, but still with major social and health impact (2,3,4).
Both outbreaks occurred in countries with poor health systems, which made early diagnosis and the immediate application of containment strategies difficult (1,2,3)
IN SUMMARY :
Overall, it is estimated that both outbreaks in 1976 had about 600 cases, with approximately 430 to 440 deaths, with a mortality in the outbreak of ZAIRE of 88 to 90% and in the SUDAN outbreak of 53 to 55%, reflecting the aggressiveness of the virus and the high vulnerability of the affected populations at that time (1,3,4).
These outbreaks prompted an intense INTERNATIONAL response, to determine the causal agents, animal reservoirs and routes of transmission (1–4), highlighting the following patterns from an epidemiological point of view:
- Initial outbreak of cases in a community or health institution.
- Spread through unsafe medical practices or family care without protection.
- Funeral rituals with direct contact with the bodies of the victims (1,3,4), facts taken into account today for the future detection of new epidemics:
- isolation protocols, use of personal protective equipment, and surveillance systems (1–4).
DETECTION OF THE VIRUSES:
Despite the diagnostic limitations of the time, virological analyses made it possible to differentiate the viruses involved in each country:
1.) ZAIRE EBOLAVIRUS, and
2.) SUDAN EBOLAVIRUS, with different genetic characteristics and lethality levels (1,2,3,5).
This taxonomic differentiation has been important and key to understanding why some outbreaks cause very high mortality rates, while others present somewhat lower lethality, which has made it possible to develop epidemiological approaches, different treatments, and vaccines depending on the type of virus in a given outbreak (1–4).
The Zaire outbreak in 1976
was very DEADLY, because a HIGHLY aggressive virus encountered
hospitals with low infrastructure, reused syringes, high-risk
funeral practices
and a total absence of isolation protocols, therefore most cases ended in death before receiving minimal care
(1,2,3,4,5).
| YEAR | COUNTRY / LOCATION | APPROX. NUMBER OF CASES | APPROX. NUMBER OF DEATHS | APPROX. MORTALITY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1976 | DRC (Yambuku, Ebola River) | ~318 | ~280 | 88–90% |
| 1976 | Sudan (Nzara–Maridi) | ~284 | ~151 | 53–55% |
| TOTAL | ~602 CASES | ~431 DEATHS | ~71.6% | |
2.) SUDAN EBOLAVIRUS (SUDV): It was also described in the first outbreak of 1976, in
Nzara y Maridi
(then Sudan, today South Sudan),
also with manifestations of HEMORRHAGIC FEVER, with elevated mortality. This variant also caused
numerous cases, with
a lower lethality
than the Zaire variant Ebolavirus, ranging between
approximately 40% and 60%.. It also infects humans and primates (1,3).
| EBOVARIANT | COUNTRY / LOCATION | YEAR | NUMBER OF CASES | MORTALITY | INFECTION DEGREE (HUMAN / ANIMAL) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV) | Yambuku, DRC | 1976 | Thousands of cases in several outbreaks | 40–90% (average ~50%) | High: very lethal in humans and primates. |
| Sudan ebolavirus (SUDV) | Nzara, Sudan (today South Sudan) | 1976 | Several hundred cases | 40–60% | High: very pathogenic in humans and primates. |
| Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BDBV) | Bundibugyo, Uganda | 2007 | Few hundred cases | ~30% | Moderate: pathogenic in humans and primates. |
| Tai Forest ebolavirus (TAFV) | Tai Forest, Côte d'Ivoire | 1994 | Very few cases (1–2) | Low / not well quantified | Low–moderate in humans; affects wildlife. |
| Reston ebolavirus (RESTV) | Reston, Virginia, USA (monkeys from Philippines) | 1989 | 0 severe cases in humans; only in primates and pigs | 0% | High in primates; very low or asymptomatic in humans; mild in pigs. |
Virus: Zaire, Sudan, Bundibugyo and Tai Forest: produce disease by the virus of Ebola in humans, with variable lethality according to lineage and outbreak.
Virus: Reston: does not cause disease clinical in humans, but yes high mortality in monkeys and infection in pigs, so its degree of infection in animals is high; in humans cases subclinical.
2.) EPOMOPS FRANQUETI.
SOURCE: GBIF.ORG
| YEAR | COUNTRY | NUMBER | MORTALITY | VIRUS | NOTES |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1976 | ZAIRE (NOW DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO) | 318 | 88% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | first recognized outbreak. |
| 1976 | SUDAN | 284 | 53% | EBOLA-SUDAN | outbreak simultaneous with the zaire one. |
| 1977 | ZAIRE (NOW DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO) | 1 | 100% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | isolated case after the first outbreak. |
| 1979 | SUDAN | 34 | 65% | EBOLA-SUDAN | new outbreak in sudan. |
| 1994 | IVORY COAST | 1 | 0% | EBOLA-TAÏ FOREST | isolated human case. |
| 1994 | GABON | 52 | 59% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | outbreak in central africa. |
| 1995 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 315 | 81% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | major outbreak in kikwit. |
| 1996 | GABON | 31 | 68% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | new outbreak in gabon. |
| 2000 | UGANDA | 425 | 53% | EBOLA-SUDAN | major outbreak in gulu. |
| 2001 | GABON | 65 | 59% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | outbreak in central africa. |
| 2001 | REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 59 | 79% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | cross-border or regional outbreak. |
| 2002 | REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 143 | 79% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | major outbreak. |
| 2003 | REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 35 | 89% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | high lethality outbreak. |
| 2004 | SUDAN | 17 | 53% | EBOLA-SUDAN | small outbreak. |
| 2005 | REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 12 | 75% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | limited outbreak. |
| 2007 | UGANDA | 149 | 25% | BUNDIBUGYO EBOLAVIRUS | first recognized outbreak of that species. |
| 2007 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 264 | 71% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | outbreak in western kasai. |
| 2008 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 32 | 82% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | later smaller outbreak. |
| 2012 | UGANDA | 24 | 46% | EBOLA-SUDAN | outbreak in kibaale. |
| 2012 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 36 | 36% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | outbreak in orientale. |
| 2013 | GUINEA | 1 | — | EBOLA-ZAIRE | start of the major west african outbreak. |
| 2014 | GUINEA | 3,814 | 66% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | main focus of the outbreak. |
| 2014 | LIBERIA | 10,675 | 45% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | most affected country in the west african outbreak. |
| 2014 | SIERRA LEONE | 14,124 | 28% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | country with the most cases in that outbreak. |
| 2014 | NIGERIA | 20 | 40% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | imported and contained outbreak. |
| 2014 | SENEGAL | 1 | 0% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | imported isolated case. |
| 2014 | MALI | 8 | 25% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | limited transmission. |
| 2014 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 66 | 71% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | outbreak independent of the west african one. |
| 2015 | GUINEA, LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE | ≈ 5,000 | ≈ 40% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | residual cases and persistent transmission of the west african outbreak (2014–2016). |
| 2016 | GUINEA, LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE | ≈ 1,500 | ≈ 40% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | final cases and closure phase of the west african outbreak (declared over in 2016). |
| 2017 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 8 | 75% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | small outbreak in likati. |
| 2018 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 54 | 64% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | outbreak in équateur. |
| 2018 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 54 | 64% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | outbreak in the east of the country. |
| 2019 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 3,470 | 66% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | major outbreak in north kivu and ituri. |
| 2020 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 130 | 77% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | closure outbreak of the regional event. |
| 2021 | GUINEA | 16 | 56% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | new outbreak in the southeastern part of the country. |
| 2021 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 11 | 55% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | new outbreak in the east. |
| 2022 | UGANDA | 164 | 44% | EBOLA-SUDAN | outbreak in mubende. |
| 2022 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 1 | 100% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | isolated case in beni. |
| 2023 | EQUATORIAL GUINEA | 17 | 59% | EBOLA-ZAIRE | first recognized outbreak in the country. |
| 2024 | UGANDA | 1 | 100% | EBOLA-SUDAN | isolated case confirmed at the start of the year. |
| 2025 | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO | 64 | 70% | BUNDIBUGYO EBOLAVIRUS | most recent reported outbreak. |
| COUNTRY | TYPE OF CASE | NUMBER | YEAR | VIRUS | NOTES |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SWITZERLAND | 1 imported case (probable laboratory exposure) | 1 | 1976 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Laboratory worker exposed to Ebola-Zaire virus in Switzerland; there was no community spread (3). |
| SWITZERLAND | 1 imported case (probable laboratory exposure) | 1 | 1980 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Second laboratory worker case exposed in Switzerland; there was no community transmission (3). |
| PHILIPPINES/U.S. | 1 case of Reston virus (not pathogenic for humans) | 1 | 1989–1990 | RESTON EBOLAVIRUS | Reston virus detected in monkeys imported into the U.S. from the Philippines; workers had subclinical infection and no severe disease (4,5) |
| ITALY | 1 imported case (laboratory worker) | 1 | 1992 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Laboratory technician exposed to Ebola-Zaire virus in Italy; there was no transmission (3). |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 1 imported case (laboratory researcher) | 1 | 1996 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Scientist in the United Kingdom exposed to Ebola in a laboratory; there was no spread (3). |
| SPAIN | 1 imported case + 1 local transmission case | 2 | 2014 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Nun from Liberia and the nurse who cared for her. There was no spread beyond this case (1,3,4) |
| UNITED STATES | Imported cases + 2 local transmission cases | 4 | 2014 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | All linked to the 2014–2016 epidemic in West Africa; includes healthcare workers and close contacts. There was no sustained community outbreak (1,3,4). |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 1 imported case | 1 | 2014 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Healthcare worker who arrived from Sierra Leone; isolated with no community transmission (1,3,4). |
| ITALY | 1 imported case | 1 | 2014 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Person from West Africa; controlled with no additional transmission (1,3,4). |
| UNITED STATES | Imported case (health worker) | 1 | 2021 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Healthcare worker who returned from an African country; quickly isolated with no transmission (1,3,4). |
| SPAIN | Imported case (person returning from sub-Saharan Africa) | 1 | 2022 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Person returning from an African outbreak; strict surveillance, no local transmission (1,3). |
| FRANCE | Imported case (healthcare personnel) | 1 | 2022 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Healthcare professional returning from West Africa; under surveillance, with no secondary infections (1,3,4). |
| GERMANY | Imported case (person returning from Africa) | 1 | 2023 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Patient isolated with confirmed diagnosis; no transmission to the community (1,3,4). |
| ITALY | Imported case (health worker) | 1 | 2023 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Healthcare personnel returning from outbreak area; controlled with no transmission (1,3,4). |
| UNITED KINGDOM | Imported case (person returning from Africa) | 1 | 2024 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Isolated imported case, no community transmission (1,3,4). |
| UNITED STATES | Imported case (surveillance model) | 1 | 2024 | EBOLA-ZAIRE | Case detected in a traveler from Africa; early intervention, no spread (1,3,4). |
| SPAIN | Close surveillance (suspected case, negative) | 0 | 2025 | — | Suspected case investigated; studies confirmed absence of Ebola (1,3). |
The treatment of Ebola virus disease combines EBOLA VIRUS intensive supportive treatment and, when available, specific drugs against the virus, in addition to preventive vaccines in outbreak contexts, which we will mention later (1,2,3,4,10,12,14,16).
A.) FIRST MEASURES:
First, supportive treatment is essential in all cases and usually includes:
- Intravenous rehydration or oral to correct losses from vomiting, diarrhea and sweating, avoiding shock and complications from dehydration (2,3,4,10,12,14).
- Symptom control: use of antipyretics and analgesics for fever and pain, antiemeti for nausea and vomiting, and organ support when renal, hepatic or respiratory failure appears (2,3,4,11,12,14,16).
- Monoclonal antibodies like mAb114 and REGN‑EB3, that in clinical trials in the outbreak of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) showed a notable reduction in mortality compared to standard therapy, and are used in certain Ebola management protocols at referral centers (2,10,14,15,16).
- Drugs and therapies under investigation, like convalescent serum (survivor plasma), and antivirals like ZMapp, MB‑003, BCX4430 or other compounds studied in previous outbreaks, although evidence is more limited and their use is usually restricted to trials or emergency protocols (2,15,16,17).
C.) PREVENTION OF EBOLAVIRUS: THE VACCINES.
- Mechanism of action: It is a live attenuated vaccine that uses the vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) genetically modified: its glycoprotein G is replaced by the GP glycoprotein of Ebola-Zaire. When administered, VSV expresses this GP protein, which stimulates the immune system to produce neutralizing antibodies against Ebola. Protection begins at 10 days and reduces mortality by up to 50%.
Genetic modification: Glycoprotein G of VSV is removed and replaced by the glycoprotein GP of the virus Ebola-Bundibugyo (rVSVΔG/BDBV-GP).
- Mechanism of action: It works similarly to Ervebo: the modified VSV expresses the GP glycoprotein of Bundibugyo, which stimulates the immune system to produce neutralizing antibodies specific against the Ebola-Bundibugyo, generating humoral immunity, even so WHO is not using it in the CURRENT OUTBREAK 2026 caused by the variant Ebola-Bundibugyo, declaring: NO APPROVED VACCINE for BUNDIBUGYO EBOLAVIRUS (BDBV) (3,13,14,16,19).
D.) SUMMARY:
| COUNTRY | YEAR | NUMBER | FATALITY | VIRUS | NOTES |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| democratic republic of congo | 2026 | 1,077 suspected cases / 121 confirmed | 177–240 deaths reported | BUNDIBUGYO EBOLAVIRUS (BDBV) | outbreak declared on may 15, 2026 in ituri; spreads to ituri, nord-kivu and sud-kivu. |
| uganda | 2026 | 7 confirmed cases | 1 death confirmed | BUNDIBUGYO EBOLAVIRUS (BDBV) | cases epidemiologically linked to outbreak in drc. |
- Total number of cases: 1,084 cases (1,077 suspected + 121 confirmed in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) + 7 confirmed in Uganda)
- Mortality percentage: Between 16.4% and 22.1% (177–240 deaths out of 1,084 cases)
Produced by Dr. José Lapenta R. Dermatologist
Venezuela 1.998-2.026
Producido por Dr. José Lapenta R. Dermatólogo
Venezuela
1.998-2.026
Tlf: 0414-2976087 - 04127766810 - 04243431100



